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Agendas, Arguments, and Political Theory
John Harman, St. John Fisher College
Deborah Vanderbilt, St. John Fisher College
I f teaching is not the oldest profession,it certainly has a long historical pedi-
gree. The frustrations teaching evokes
likely have an equally long pedigree.
One sees in Plato’s Republic, for exam-
ple, Socrates’ frustration in trying to
convey to Glaukon the aims of the edu-
cational scheme he is presenting to his
interlocutors in Book 8. His evident dif-
ficulties relaying this information have
doubtless struck sympathetic chords in
the breasts of countless generations of
teachers. Frustration has certainly been
the case for the present authors, particu-
larly in teaching the analysis and under-
standing of secondary commentary on
classic texts; when reading such articles,
students express puzzlement about the
long debate over seemingly trivial
points.1 Many come away from such
classes convinced it is not worth invest-
ing time in understanding classic texts
because the discussion of them centers
on apparently arcane and obscure gram-
matical, historical, or technical questions.
This essay presents an approach with
which the authors have had some mea-
sure of success in helping students “see
the point” of this especially difficult di-
mension of analyzing and understanding
texts and authors. Our approach teaches
students to identify and appreciate the
“agenda argument” often put forward by
such commentators. An “agenda argu-
ment” is a contemporary scholar’s effort
to address a current problem or issue
through critical reflection on an iconic
text or author in the field. The term
“agenda” is appropriate because it clari-
fies that the scholar has an interest in an
underlying general claim through discus-
sion of the technical points being de-
bated. In other words, the scholar has a
larger agenda in mind that guides the
selection of issues and determines the
use of points in the text.
Agenda Arguments
Nearly 20 years ago, John Gunnell
~1988, 71–87! detailed the history of the
split between political theory and the rest
of the discipline.2 He attributed the split
in large part to the efforts of émigré po-
litical scientists circa World War II to fix
blame on some aspect of contemporary
society for the rise of totalitarian ideolo-
gies. While Gunnell’s purpose was to
locate the origins of a disciplinary quar-
rel, his effort helps illustrate what an
agenda argument seeks to accomplish.
Specifically, in such arguments authors
attempt to deal with an issue of contem-
porary concern ~in the case of many of
those discussed by Gunnell, responsibil-
ity for the rise of fascism or Stalinism!
through the medium of an argument
about the meaning of a major figure in
political philosophy or thought.3 Often
such larger-issue arguments do not ap-
pear to be the major focus of the analy-
sis. Instead, the reader is initially
confronted by what appears to be a much
narrower dispute over the correct inter-
pretation of a passage or detail from
some aspect of the work of a classic fig-
ure in political thought. It is only upon
reflection on the significance of what is
at issue that the broader argument
appears.
That Gunnell and others discussed the
appropriateness of such agenda argu-
ments to the discipline of political sci-
ence is not an issue here. Decades ago
the practice might have been novel or
unique. It is hardly so today. The prac-
tice has become so widely established in
political theory as to render much of
what is written almost unintelligible
without appreciating such arguments. In
this, however, political theory is not
unique. Such arguments also appear in
other disciplines—literary criticism, for
example.
The reference to literary criticism—a
discipline which has had a significant
impact on current intellectual debates—
invites comparison between some other
concepts employed there and what we
have called agenda arguments. Specifi-
cally, it might be suggested that such
arguments are nothing more than what
other disciplines refer to as “subtext.”
While the concept of a subtext is similar
in some ways to an agenda argument and
is an important feature of the conversa-
tion in several disciplines, there are im-




In literary studies, subtext often de-
scribes an alternative, often deeper level
of meaning intentionally constructed by
the author through the subtle use of lan-
guage. Chaucer’s “Miller’s Tale” in The
Canterbury Tales, for example, is on the
surface an obscene fabliau but in the
subtext a satire of courtly love conven-
tions of his time. However, subtext is
also used in at least two other senses. In
much literary criticism, subtext defines
content which is not announced explic-
itly by the characters ~or author! but is
implicit or becomes understood by the
reader. Jill Mackey ~2001! describes,
for example, how “films such as Fried
Green Tomatoes or The Bostonians,
films that appear to be about heterosex-
ual relationships, ‘offer a suggestive, al-
beit tantalizing glimpse of what we
might call lesbian desire’” ~Mackey 86,
citing Whatling 1994, 186!. Finally, a
third kind of subtext, the most difficult
to present to students, represents an ana-
log to the term “agenda argument” as we
are using it in this paper. Critics writing
on literature differ, via analysis of the
text, on which school of interpretation—
feminist, Marxist, new historicist, and so
on—offers the most valid reading. Even
within schools of literary criticism, crit-
ics argue over how best to apply the ap-
proaches and assumptions of such
schools of criticism to texts.
It is this final kind of subtext that is
always of interest to academics, the cre-
ators and the proponents of positions
within schools of thought. It is this level
of subtext that often underlies the most
interesting and worthwhile arguments in
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secondary criticism. And it is this kind of
subtext ~or what we term “agenda argu-
ment”! that is nearly always impenetra-
ble for students reading on their own,




One objective of the Introduction to
Political Theory course that we have de-
veloped over several years is to instill in
our students an appreciation of the dis-
tinctive ways that authors of classic po-
litical texts deal with issues that remain
of concern today. A second objective is
to give students some experience with
the way contemporary scholars critique
these authors ~and each other!. This in-
volves having them read a selection of
articles that contest themes or topics in
the original texts to which they have
been exposed—in our class, Plato’s Re-
public and Hobbes’s Leviathan. It is in
the context of this second objective that
we introduce the concept of the author’s
agenda argument. To illustrate we use
two articles that critique Hobbes’s
Leviathan—“Hobbes’s Bourgeois Man”
by the late C. B. Macpherson ~1973! and
“Hobbes on Public Charity & the Pre-
vention of Idleness: A Liberal Case for
Welfare” by John W. Seaman ~1990!.
Macpherson’s essay is nominally about
the question of whether Hobbes’s politi-
cal doctrines, elaborated largely in Part
II, were consistent with his “materialist”
account of human nature in Part I of Le-
viathan4 Macpherson contends that a
proper appreciation of Hobbes’s material-
ism provides the key to understanding
Hobbes’s political doctrines as well. The
key to such an appreciation lies in recog-
nizing the distinctively bourgeois nature
of both his materialism and his resulting
conception of the state and society.
It is the fact, remarked by a few writers
. . . , that Hobbes’s morality is essentially
a bourgeois morality. When this is fol-
lowed back it can be seen that Hobbes’s
analysis of human nature, from which
his whole political theory is derived, is
really an analysis of bourgeois man; that
the assumptions, explicit and implicit,
upon which his psychological conclu-
sions depend are assumptions peculiarly
valid for bourgeois society. Considered
from this point of view, his materialism
falls into place understandably. It is not
necessary either to minimize its place in
his thought or to make it the whole ex-
planation. And this approach may afford
a new view of the strength and weakness
of his political thinking and of its rele-
vance today. ~239!
Macpherson claims that vanity and
“vainglory,” which play a prominent role
in Hobbes’s account of human nature,
are characteristic preoccupations of a
particular social stratum that emerged as
influential with the rise of capitalism.
This stratum is the upper middle-class
bourgeoisie, and he dates its rise to the
Renaissance. Similarly, Macpherson ar-
gues that the competitive drive for power
that Hobbes makes a central feature of
his account of human nature is also noth-
ing more than the motivation of partici-
pants in a capitalist market economy, in
contrast to “pre-capitalist societies”
~240!. He continues to note that such
elements in Hobbes’s theory of human
nature led directly to the absolutist pre-
scriptions in his theory of the state—the
vesting of all power in a monarch who
needed to inspire fear and awe to keep
his subjects from despoiling each other.
Certainly, many elements of Macpher-
son’s account are suspect: the claim that
capitalist society existed during the Re-
naissance, that such elements as Hobbes
makes part of human nature are unique
to a capitalist mentality as opposed, say,
to a feudal aristocratic mentality. Nor
does a close reading of Leviathan yield
any insistence on the primacy of markets
or the role of money on Hobbes’s part.
The characteristic centrality of freedom
from government interference that marks
most capitalist thought is likewise com-
pletely foreign to Hobbes’s account of
the state.5 Yet to pursue the argument in
such terms would be to entirely miss the
point of Macpherson’s essay. For his aim
is clearly to exploit the qualms most feel
over both Hobbes’s description of human
nature and the nearly tyrannical authority
he gives to government and to transform
those qualms into an argument against
contemporary capitalist democracies.
Macpherson drives home the underlying
purpose of the argument in this passage
near the end of the essay.
The continuing strength and the present
pertinence of his @Hobbes’s# political
theory are due to this. For it is not en-
tirely an illusion that in a capitalist soci-
ety men are free from normal social ties
except those imposed by the state. There
is an obvious sense in which the individ-
ual in capitalist society is freer from
social ties than the individual in any so-
ciety based on status. The greater inse-
curity of men is a measure of their
greater freedom. The social ties in capi-
talist society are real, being largely de-
termined by the individual’s relation to
capital, but are not as cohesive as the
social ties of other societies. The result
is that on the whole a stronger state is
necessary to maintain a capitalist society
than is needed to maintain a society in
which the social relations are more obvi-
ously personal, or more obviously pur-
poseful, and so more easily
understandable. ~248!
In other words, Hobbes’s insistence on a
strong state reveals the extent to which
such a state must remain a basis for capi-
talism, even when its ruthless Hobbesian
nature is obscured—as it is today, pre-
sumably—by a veneer of democratic
procedures. Absent an appreciation of
this ultimate aim—a critique of contem-
porary capitalist society—Macperson’s
emphasis on discovering bourgeois ele-
ments in Hobbes’s thought must inevita-
bly appear to be not much more than a
scholarly quirk or an exercise in Marxist
exegesis.
To bring the point home to students,
we point out such passages and note that
Macpherson only makes this argument
explicit near the end of the essay. The
bulk of the essay is devoted to making
the more technical argument concerning
the validity of earlier scholars’ claims
about the relationship between Hobbes’s
materialism and his political doctrines.
This, we note, is often the case with an
author’s agenda argument. Hints of it
will appear in the introduction and more
fully developed elements in the conclu-
sion. These are the natural locations for
comments designed to point out the
broader significance of the more techni-
cal arguments in the body of the essay.
And it is precisely the significance of an
essay that generally constitutes its
agenda argument.
To suggest that such an agenda argu-
ment is not unique to Macpherson nor
Marxists like him, we turn to Seaman’s
essay. Pedagogically, we have found it
essential to pair essays to illustrate the
underlying controversy between scholars
whose technical arguments may not ex-
actly mesh. When examined in the con-
text of Macpherson’s discussion, the
nominal focus of Seaman’s article—the
nature and derivation of welfare policy
in Leviathan—turns out to be significant
primarily as a counter-argument to
Macpherson’s claims.
The controversy in Seaman’s article
focuses on the question of whether
Hobbes’s argument in Leviathan made
provision for the care of the poor.
Seaman cites passages in Leviathan that
refer to such policies and then remarks
on the number of scholars who have
overlooked these passages in holding
that Hobbes neglected this element of
society. Seaman ~1990, 107! includes
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“the usually perceptive” Macpherson ~al-
though in a different set of essays! among
these scholars ~which makes this article
useful for introducing students to the idea
of a dialogue within the discipline!. He
remarks that Macpherson overlooked
Hobbes’s explicit reference to such poli-
cies “because of his unargued assumption
that Hobbesian individualism and the
welfare state are incompatible”~106!.
Seaman accepts the extreme individu-
alist characterization of Hobbes’s account
of human nature that most of the disci-
pline teaches—that people are motivated
exclusively by rational self-interest. But
he argues that this Hobbesian extreme
individualism does not preclude a social
acceptance of the responsibility to care
for those who are unable to fend for
themselves—a welfare state, in other
words. He concludes his argument with
this observation:
Hobbes’s doctrine provides the basis for
a far more ~or far less! extensive welfare
state than that advanced in the Levia-
than. Those who wish to recover the
natural rights tradition in order to defend
a minimalist state and assault welfare
policies may therefore want to note the
dangers of doing so. Those who wish to
defend the welfare state and find it nec-
essary to turn to a non-natural rights
doctrine as the basis of liberalism may
want to notice the availability of an al-
ternative position in the formidable and
rigorous Hobbes. ~125!
The significance of his argument, in
other words, is that it is certainly possi-
ble for even extreme individualists, such
as the classic and contemporary apolo-
gists for capitalism, to consistently sup-
port relatively humane social policies to
care for the poor and those unable to
fend for themselves. Given his citation
of Macpherson early on, this is clearly
meant as a direct refutation of Macpher-
son’s own criticism of capitalism’s
Hobbesian foundations.
Using these two articles ~with suitable
explanations of Marx’s theories, for ex-
ample!, we are able to demonstrate to
students the way Macpherson and Sea-
man critique and defend contemporary
liberal democracy through the medium of
an otherwise arcane exchange over the
proper interpretation of Hobbes’s Levia-
than. This approach and technique can
be used with any number of classic texts
and commentary.6 While this is certainly
a challenge for some students to grasp,
for most it opens a whole new avenue
for appreciating an otherwise nearly
impenetrable literature and provides op-
portunities and models for more sophis-
ticated argument.
Conclusion
To return to the example of Socrates’s
efforts in Book 8 of the Republic to
teach the “slower” Glaukon what his ed-
ucational reforms were meant to achieve,
we may all perhaps remember what we
initially thought when confronted with
our own Socratic professors in collegiate
classrooms. Putting the fact that Glaukon
is a Platonic literary device aside, most
of us might recall our Glaukonic bewil-
derment at “where these professors were
getting this stuff.” Many of us certainly
felt that they were “just making it up,”
or that we were being treated to individ-
ual displays of professorial arrogance,
despite assurances from our professors
that lessons about the contemporary sig-
nificance of classic texts were really
there. Obviously, at some point most of
us got it and became devotees of the
genre and participants in the dialogue
over these matters ourselves. But it is
worth noting that the initial reactions of
our students today are the same as our
own were. They, too, are often bewil-
dered at “where this stuff is coming
from.” In the absence of an explanation,
many ~if not most! often conclude that
they are being treated to an impossible
and cruel test, in which they are ex-
pected to guess what is going on in our
minds about Plato or Hobbes, or to re-
member the convoluted explanations we
concoct, but which have little real bear-
ing on more pressing contemporary prob-
lems. These suspicions must play an
important role in creating a corrosive
cynicism in our students that many of us
have observed in unguarded moments.
Such cynicism serves to justify, in their
minds at least, resort to desperate mea-
sures like plagiarism and other forms of
cheating in a perverse effort to level the
playing field.
In addition to being an antidote for
classroom cynicism, however, this ap-
proach addresses some deeper issues
within the discipline. Our students come
to the major willing to read the texts that
historically define the science of politics.
Unfortunately, they ~and perhaps some of
their professors! confine that reading to
the literal interpretation of the text. Stop-
ping at that point precludes the richer
understanding of the role such works
continue to play both in the discipline
and in broader intellectual currents. In-
deed, we argue that one cannot genuinely
understand these texts without appreciat-
ing how they can be used to explore and
enrich current debates inside and outside
the academy.
Too many political scientists whose
exposure to political theory in college
and graduate school did not advance be-
yond a literal reading of the text to an
engagement with it still see such endeav-
ors ~and indeed political theory itself ! as
arcane and dispensable. Absent the kind
of structured and intentional effort we
describe here, most students, with rare
exception, will never advance to this
level of engagement. However, this leap
from reading to engaging with texts de-
fines what political theorists do, and to
those who have made this leap, these
texts are not only indispensable but in-
deed vital. In the present authors’ curric-
ulum, we make this investment early on;
in our first two introductory courses, this
technique takes a third to a half of our
instruction time. We have found that the
result of this effort—an increase in the
number of students for whom the rele-
vance of classic texts becomes appar-
ent—is worth expending significant
classroom hours. Finally, this approach
becomes an effective way of inviting
students to join in the academic dialogue
and an assurance that we, as professors,
are confident of their intellectual matu-
rity and ability to do so.
Notes
1. This project grew out of the shared expe-
riences and discussions of the authors in teach-
ing courses in their respective disciplines that
attempt to bring students into the professional
discourse of the discipline through exposure to
articles in professional journals. This might be
considered an aspect of what M. W. Jackson re-
fers to as “going deep” in understanding the
topic. M. W. Jackson, “Skimming the Surface or
Going Deep,” PS: Political Science & Politics
28, no.3 ~September 1995!: 512–14.
2. Gunnell stands in a long line of critics
who have questioned the relationship between
studying historical figures and the “modern”
study of politics. Cf., Harry Eckstein, “Political
Theory and the Study of Politics: A Report of a
Conference,” American Political Science Review
50, no. 2 ~1956!: 475–87.
3. While the examples of this sort of argu-
ment in political theory are legion, Karl Popper’s
The Open Society and It’s Enemies, Vols. 1 &
2 ~Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971!
and Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History
~Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985! are
the paradigms.
4. In what follows I necessarily carica-
ture the very rich and fascinating argument
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Macpherson presents. My argument is less about
the detailed points he makes than the reason
someone other than a specialist in Hobbesian
thought should take it seriously.
5. Macpherson acknowledges much of this
criticism and, indeed, spends much of Section 3
of the article addressing it. Cf. pp. 246–8.
6. We extend this through examination of a
similar exchange over the interpretation of Pla-
to’s Republic in Arlene Saxonhouse’s “Comedy
in Callipolis: Animal Imagery in the Republic,”
American Political Science Review 72, no. 3
~September 1978!: 888–901 and George Klos-
ko’s “Implementing the Ideal State,” Journal of
Politics 43, no. 2 ~May 1981!: 365–89.
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